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“Indian” as a Political Classification:  
Reading the Tribe Back into the Indian  
Child Welfare Act 
 




In the summer of 2018, the Ninth Circuit will consider an appeal from the dismissal 
of a constitutional challenge to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Brought by a 
conservative think-tank, this case frames the ICWA as race-based legislation, violating 
equal protection by depriving Indian children of the same procedures as non-Indian 
children in child custody cases. In reality, the ICWA seeks to protect the interests of tribes, 
Indian families, and Indian children by establishing special procedures and obligations in 
Indian child custody cases. On its face, the ICWA is concerned not with the race of 
children, but with the special status of tribes and their political membership. As discussed 
in this Paper, a racial understanding of the ICWA is inconsistent with both the statute itself 
and the historically mixed political-racial status of tribes in the United States. While the 
Supreme Court created an opening for a race-based view of the ICWA in Baby Veronica, 
prior precedents embraced a political understanding of “Indian” where Congress intended 
to support tribal sovereignty. This Paper argues that any fair reading of the ICWA must 
treat “Indian” as a political rather than racial classification, and that the ICWA cannot 
be subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection. To do otherwise is to read the tribe out 
of the Act, which is not just inconsistent with the statute, but dismissive of the unique history 




Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA or the Act)1 in 
response to the “alarmingly high percentage” of “often unwarranted” removals of Indian2 
children from their homes.3 In determining this “high percentage” of removals, Congress 
relied on surveys conducted by the Association on American Indian Affairs indicating that 
                                                 
1 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012). 
2 This Paper will use the term “Indian” rather than Native American or American Indian to be consistent 
with the statutory language of the ICWA. Furthermore, the Bureau of Indian Affairs currently recognizes 
567 “Indian” tribes, which is a political recognition. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive 
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019 (Jan. 29, 2016). As this Paper 
argues, the use of the term “Indian” in the ICWA is political, not racial. Therefore, it is especially important 
to use the designated term for the political category. 
3 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 1978 WL 8515 (“The 
wholesale separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect 
of American Indian life today.”). 
 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY   [2018 
 418
25% to 35% of Indian children were “placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or 
institutions.”4 For example, in South Dakota, the number of Indian children in foster homes 
was almost sixteen times greater per capita than the number of non-Indian children in foster 
homes.5 While the disparity may be understandable if removals were necessary for the 
children’s well-being, Congress found that the removals were “often unwarranted.”6 To 
illustrate, 99% of removals of Indian children were based on the categories of “neglect” or 
“social deprivation” rather than physical abuse.7 Unlike physical abuse, Congress found 
these broad categories allowed social workers to exercise their discretion inappropriately 
by removing Indian children from safe homes.8  
Additionally, many Indian families were unable to qualify as foster or adoptive 
families because they did not meet standards “based on middle-class values,”9 resulting in 
most Indian children being placed with non-Indian families.10 Not only did Indian children 
suffer trauma due to unwarranted separation, but they were also forced to adapt to a new 
culture.11 At the same time, tribes themselves felt the loss of these children, as “there is no 
resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than 
their children . . .”12 Congress could have focused solely on the damage to the individual 
child, but instead enacted legislation based on the “special relationship between the United 
States and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian 
people . . .”13 In so doing, Congress inherently treated “Indian” as a political rather than 
racial category, enacting protections for Indian families, while also protecting the 
continued sovereignty of tribes. 
Of course, the ICWA’s provisions do not only affect Indian children, families, and 
the tribes to which they belong. Non-Indian families wishing to serve as foster-care 
placements or permanent adoptive families for Indian children must also contend with the 
ICWA’s “active efforts”14 and “continued custody”15 provisions, as well as the possibility 




7 Id. at 10. 
8 See id. (analyzing various cultural differences that social workers misunderstood and used against Indian 
families in neglect cases, including the practice of leaving children with non-nuclear family members who 
were considered “close, responsible members of the family,” and more permissive disciplinary tactics than 
those to which social workers were accustomed). Abuse of alcohol was also applied disproportionately 
against the Indian community, further displaying cultural bias. Id. For a comparison of white and Indian 
family structures, and a discussion of the assimilation period preceding the passing of the ICWA, see Linda 
Lacy, The White Man’s Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327 
(1986). 
9 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11. 
10 This phenomenon is also largely the result of the Indian Adoption Project of the 1950s, and the campaign 
to “Kill the Indian, Save the Child.” For a discussion of the Indian Adoption Project, see Lila J. George, 
Why the Need for the Indian Child Welfare Act?, 5 J. MULTICULTURAL SOC. WORK 165 (1997). 
11 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11. 
12 See 25 U.S.C. § 1901. 
13 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 1–2. 
14 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). This provision is discussed infra in Section II. 
15 Id. § 1912(f); see also id. § 1912(e). These provisions are discussed infra in Section II.  
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of tribal intervention16 and the statutory preference for an Indian family placement.17 By 
setting different standards for Indian children involved in child custody proceedings, the 
ICWA engendered resentment among certain groups and has become the subject of a 
modern battle in courtrooms18 and media channels19 across the country.  
At the core of the disagreement is whether the term “Indian” is a racial or political 
classification.20 Those who would repeal the ICWA view “Indian” as a racial classification, 
and therefore argue the ICWA is racially discriminatory and in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.21 To the contrary, I argue in the following that “Indian” is best 
interpreted as a political classification for purposes of the ICWA, as evidenced by both the 
historical context of Indians in the U.S. and the ICWA’s provisions, which manifest 
congressional intent to protect tribes as political units. Any argument against the ICWA 
should address “Indian” as a political classification, because to do otherwise is to ignore 
the major political issue at stake: tribal sovereignty. 
In the following four-part analysis, I first examine the language and purpose of the 
ICWA, which I find treats Indians as a political category, in large part by deferring to tribal 
definitions of membership. Second, I explore the historical racialization of Indians, which 
reveals the unique nature of Indian tribes as mostly political, and to a lesser extent, racial. 
                                                 
16 Id. § 1911(c). This provision is discussed infra in Section II. 
17 See id. § 1915 (a); see also id. § 1915 (b). These provisions are discussed infra in Section II. 
18 For a discussion of state court resistance to the ICWA, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the 
Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587 
(2002). 
19 For example, the story of Laurynn Whiteshield, an Indian child who died shortly after being placed with 
family on a reservation, has become a talking point for both sides. For a use of her story in a larger critique 
of the ICWA, see George F. Will, The Blood-Stained Indian Child Welfare Act, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-blood-stained-indian-child-welfare-
act/2015/09/02/d3aea62e-50cb-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html. For a critique of the use of her story 
in the anti-ICWA movement, see Josh Israel & Bryan Dewan, Why a Conservative Legal Organization is 
Desperately Trying to Kill the Indian Child Welfare Act, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 8, 2016), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2016/04/08/3754462/indian-child-welfare-act-case-goldwater/. For the use 
of Laurynn’s story in a promotional video by the same group that is bringing the case of Carter, et. al. v. 
Washburn, et. al., No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 WL 1019685, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017), 
discussed in Section IV infra, see Mark Flatten, Death on a Reservation, GOLDWATER INST. (June 10, 
2015), http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/constitutional-rights/government-preferences/death-on-
a-reservation/. 
20 For a prime example of the interpretation of Indian as racial, see Helping Amend a Policy: The Indian 
Child Welfare Act, HOME FOREVER, http://www.home-4-ever.org/helping-amend-a-policy-the-indian-child-
welfare-act/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2016) (“In so many of the cases impacted by ICWA, the children are 
multi-ethnic, with mere traces of Native-American blood and no previous connection to their tribes or 
customs. In one case, a tribe fought in court to prevent the adoption of a child who was 1/512 Native.”). See 
also ICWA IS HURTING FAMILIES, icwaishurtingfamilies.blogspot.com (last visited May 2, 2016) (“Scores 
of multi-racial children are negatively affected by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) every year. Many 
are deprived of child protection equal to what is provided to other children.”). 
21 Not all vocal challengers seek to repeal the ICWA in its entirety. See CERA’s Letter on the ICWA to 
Congress, CITIZENS EQUAL RTS. ALLIANCE, http://citizensalliance.org/ceras-letter-icwa-congress/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2018). Citizens Equal Rights Alliance would amend the ICWA to “require every court to 
consider the best interests of the children involved,” and the “intentions of the parents.” Id. Their proposed 
amendment goes further to say that usually it is in the child’s best interest to be with their parents, and, if 
not, then with “caring adoptive parents.” Id. The proposed amendment is vague, but seems to effectively 
nullify the ICWA by undermining the placement preferences. See id.  
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Additionally, historical analysis shows that the racial element of tribal recognition and 
membership largely developed for political reasons.22 Taken together, statutory 
interpretation and historical perspectives both suggest that the Supreme Court struck the 
correct balance regarding the status of Indians in Morton v. Mancari, outside of the ICWA 
context.23 In that case, the Court upheld legislation that rationally relates to tribes’ unique 
political status, even though the statute at issue defined Indian in part based on blood.24  
Third, I look to the Supreme Court’s understanding of the ICWA itself, which 
unfortunately provides conflicting visions of the Act. While the Supreme Court seemed to 
follow Morton v. Mancari in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,25 in 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (Baby Veronica), the Court implied that provisions of the 
ICWA may violate the Equal Protection Clause.26 In so doing, the Court misinterpreted the 
ICWA and imposed its own understanding of “Indian,” without regard for congressional 
intent or principles of statutory interpretation. 
Finally, I turn to a current case against the ICWA on appeal in the Ninth Circuit, 
Carter, et al. v. Washburn, et al.27 This modern equal protection challenge to the ICWA 
depends heavily on a reading of the Act as race-based legislation, with the goal of achieving 
strict scrutiny review and crippling the ICWA. By reading the ICWA as race-based 
legislation, ICWA opponents assert their own definition of what it is to be “Indian” in a 
manner that, if accepted by the courts, would undermine tribal sovereignty. After Baby 
Veronica, and with an eye towards a changing Supreme Court, it seems likely that this case, 
or a similar constitutional challenge to the ICWA, could succeed in the nation’s highest 
court. This moment in time may prove critical for ICWA advocates to develop their most 
cogent arguments in support of its continuance. As a fundamental defense of the ICWA, I 
argue that any legitimate constitutional challenge to its provisions must meet the statute on 
its own terms, and contend with “Indian” as a political, not racial, classification.  
 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE ICWA 
 
The statutory language of the ICWA itself demonstrates a broad interest in tribal 
welfare and culture, recognizing Congress’s special duty to protect the interests of Indian 
tribes.28 Congress designed the ICWA to “protect the best interests of Indian children and 
to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”29 To meet these 
                                                 
22 That is not to say that other racial classifications did not develop for political reasons. The broader 
concept of race arguably developed to “justify the subordination of other people,” which is inherently a 
political reason. See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 4 (2012) 
(arguing that race as a biological concept first developed for this political reason, and was later “imported 
into the American legal system as a ‘background rule’ . . .” thereby becoming a legal concept). However, 
for purposes of this Paper I will focus narrowly on Indian tribes, whose political and racial elements have 
developed in a manner in many ways distinct from other minority groups. 
23 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
24 Id. at 553–54. 
25 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
26 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013). 
27 2017 WL 1019685, at *1. 
28 See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2) (stating “that Congress . . . has assumed the responsibility for the protection and 
preservation of Indian tribes and their resources”). 
29 See id. § 1902 (emphasis added). 
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interrelated goals, Congress established “minimum Federal standards” for all Indian child30 
custody proceedings,31 with “Indian child” defined based on tribal membership and 
eligibility.32 The minimum standards include placement preferences with extended family 
and tribe members33 to ensure that placements “reflect the unique values of Indian 
culture . . . .”34  
Congress adopted placement preferences reflecting Indian culture in part because of 
research indicating such preferences were in the best interests of Indian children.35 As 
found by psychiatrist Dr. Joseph Westermeyer in his studies of Indian children in non-
Indian homes in the 1970s, Indian children in such settings developed the “apple 
syndrome”36 because they did not identify as Indian, but still suffered discrimination based 
on their appearance.37 The syndrome was intended to describe a sensation in which children 
identified with the white culture of their adoptive families, but suffered cultural confusion 
due to others’ perception of them as Indian. Dr. Westermeyer found that these children 
fared even worse than Indian children of the boarding school era, who at least maintained 
some connection to their tribe.38 Notably, Congress emphasized that, according to a 1969 
                                                 
30 For purposes of the ICWA, an Indian child is defined as “any unmarried person who is under age 
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe 
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” Id. § 1903(4). 
31 See id. § 1902. “Child custody proceeding[s]” include “foster care placement,” “termination of parental 
rights,” “preadoptive placement,” and “adoptive placement.” Id. § 1903(1). 
32 See id. § 1902. For a helpful module explaining the “Indian child” determination under the ICWA, see 
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MODULE 2: DETERMINING WHETHER ICWA 
APPLIES (2016), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/ois/pdf/idc2-041202.pdf.  
33 See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference 
shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s 
extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”); see also id. § 
1915(b) (listing preferences for foster or preadoptive placements as “(i) a member of the Indian child’s 
extended family; (ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s tribe; (iii) an 
Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or (iv) an 
institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a 
program suitable to meet the Indian child’s needs”). 
34 Id. § 1902. 
35 See Lynn Klicker Uthe, The Best Interests of Indian Children in Minnesota, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 237, 
251–52 (1992) (arguing that due to cultural differences between Indians and non-Indians, such as being 
“born into a kinship network, clan, or band,” a “viable Indian identity” is in the best interest of Indian 
children). 
36 Dr. Westermeyer named the “apple syndrome” to signify that the Indian youth was red on the outside but 
white on the inside. See id. at 252. While the name of the syndrome is an artifact of another era, and 
wrongfully relies on the racial stereotype of the Indian person as “red,” the sensation of cultural confusion 
for Indian children in non-Indian families was certainly relevant at the time of ICWA’s passing. Dr. 
Westermeyer testified about his research in front of the Subcommittee of Indian Affairs in 1974, before the 
passing of the ICWA. See id. at 252 n.119 (citing to Problems that American Indian Families Face in 
Raising their Children and How these Problems are Affected by Federal Action or Inaction: Hearing on 
the Indian Child Welfare Program Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, the Comm. on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. 1–2 (1974) (statement of Hon. James Abourezk, Sen., S.D.)). 
37 See id. at 252–54 (citing Joseph Westermeyer, The Apple Syndrome in Minnesota: A Complication of 
Racial-Ethnic Discontinuity, 10 J. OPERATIONAL PSYCHIATRY 134 (1979), and Joseph Westermeyer, Ethnic 
Identity Problems Among Ten Indian Psychiatric Patients, 25 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 188 (1979)). 
38 Indian children placed in non-Indian homes experienced “severe identity confusion” and suffered higher 
rates of suicidal tendencies than “other high-risk Indian youths.” See id. at 253. In contrast, Indian children 
at boarding schools interacted with each other, and also went home for vacations. See id.  
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survey in sixteen states, 85% of Indian children in foster care were living with non-Indian 
families, forcing them “to cope with the problems of adjusting to a social and cultural 
environment much different than their own.”39 Thus, Congress understood that an adoptive 
child’s interest was inextricably linked to the child’s Indian-ness, and therefore to the 
child’s tribe. 
It is no surprise, then, that ICWA provisions grant Indian tribes unique powers in 
Indian child custody proceedings,40 effectively making the tribe a “third party” to the 
case.41 First, tribes have the power to define “Indian child.”42 Rather than impose their own 
understanding of Indian identity, Congress chose to defer to tribal standards for 
membership eligibility.43 Key to the ICWA, this definitional power reflects Indian tribes’ 
status as sovereign nations,44 as well as the importance of children to tribal sovereignty.45  
Second, the ICWA makes it easier for tribes to obtain jurisdiction over custody 
proceedings of Indian children, further securing tribal rights.46 Statutorily, tribes have 
exclusive jurisdiction in cases when the Indian child resides or is domiciled on the 
reservation.47 If the child does not live on the reservation and is not domiciled there, the 
tribe may obtain concurrent jurisdiction “upon the petition of either parent or the Indian 
custodian or the Indian child’s tribe,” and absent “good cause to the contrary” or “objection 
by either parent.”48 In addition to the ability to petition for concurrent jurisdiction, tribes 
have a general right to intervene in Indian child custody proceedings.49 In order to make 
                                                 
39 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9. 
40  The ICWA has been described as “perhaps the most far reaching legislation recognizing tribal sovereign 
interests beyond the reservation borders,” largely because of the jurisdiction provisions. See Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the Reservation Borders, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003, 
1021 (2008).  
41 See Brian D. Gallagher, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: The Congressional Foray into the Adoption 
Process, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 81, 81 (1994). 
42 See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).  
43 Id.  
44 Since the Nineteenth Century, the federal government has recognized Indian tribes’ “inherent powers of 
self-government in internal matters,” allowing them to self-govern “according to their tribal customs and 
laws.” See Patrice H. Kunesh, Borders Beyond Borders: Protecting Essential Tribal Relations Off 
Reservation Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 15, 18, 21 (2007) (quoting United 
States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 603–04 (1916)).  
45 Kunesh makes a strong case for exclusive tribal jurisdiction over Indian children who are wards of the 
tribal court, regardless of where they live. See id. at 16. In explaining the importance of the ICWA 
wardship provision, she finds that “welfare of Indian children lies at the heart of tribal sovereignty,” such 
that tribal authority in this area is “vital to the maintenance of its identity and self-determination.” See id. at 
78. 
46 Non-Indian judges played a key role in separating Indian children from their tribes by accepting social 
workers’ culturally biased reasoning. See Gallagher, supra note 41, at 85–86.  
47 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012). 
48 Id. § 1911(b). 
49 Id. § 1911(c) (“In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental 
rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to 
intervene at any point in the proceeding.”). 
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these rights effective, the ICWA requires the notification of tribes when an Indian child is 
involved in any custody proceeding.50  
Finally, although the ICWA establishes placement preferences, tribes may exercise 
their discretion to change the placement preference, so long as the placement is the “least 
restrictive setting appropriate to the particular needs of the child.”51 In theory, a tribe could 
determine that the most appropriate placement for a particular child is outside of the tribe’s 
community, thereby overriding the statutory preferences. This provision exemplifies the 
ICWA’s deference to tribal understanding of an Indian child’s best interests. The ICWA 
essentially presumes that it is in the Indian children’s best interest to be with family in their 
tribe, or with other tribal members, unless the tribe itself determines otherwise. 
The ICWA also grants certain privileges to the parents and custodians52 of Indian 
children. For example, parents of an Indian child may revoke their voluntary termination 
of parental rights any time before the proceedings are finalized, and both parents and 
custodians may revoke their consent to foster care placement or adoption.53 Additionally, 
two key provisions of the ICWA make it more difficult to remove Indian children from 
their parents or custodians in the first place. The first requires any party seeking to place 
an Indian child in foster care or to terminate the parents’ rights to show “active efforts”54 
have been made, unsuccessfully, to “provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs 
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.”55 The second requires the party 
seeking termination of parental rights to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that 
“continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”56 By creating additional burdens on 
those seeking to adopt Indian children, or to terminate parental rights, the ICWA 
underscores its clear policy preference that Indian children remain in the Indian 
                                                 
50 Id. § 1912(a) (“[W]here the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party 
seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the 
parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe.”). 
51  Id. § 1915(c). 
52 Indian custodian is defined as “any Indian person who has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal 
law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been 
transferred by the parent of such child.” Id. § 1903(6). 
53 See id. § 1913(b) (“Any parent or Indian custodian may withdraw consent to a foster care placement 
under State law at any time and, upon such withdrawal, the child shall be returned to the parent or Indian 
custodian.”); see also id. § 1913(c) (“In any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or 
adoptive placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any reason at any 
time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption, as the case may be, and the child shall 
be returned to the parent.”). 
54 “Active efforts” establishes a higher bar than “reasonable efforts,” which is what is required in non-
Indian cases. See Mark Andrews, “Active” Versus “Reasonable” Efforts: The Duties to Reunify the Family 
Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Statutes, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 85, 
86–87 (2002) (discussing how “active efforts” has been interpreted in Alaska). 
55 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). For ease of reading, this provision will be referred to as the “active efforts” 
provision. 
56 Id.  § 1912(f); see also id. § 1912(e) (requiring “clear and convincing” evidence that “continued 
custody . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child” before an Indian child 
can be placed in foster care). For ease of reading, these provisions will be referred to as the “continued 
custody” provisions. 
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community. In effect, the active efforts and continued custody provisions also interact with 
the tribal powers, buying the tribe more time to intervene in the case. 
The ICWA is not just about children and families, but also about tribal sovereignty 
and integrity. The ICWA’s provisions recognize a fundamental connection between the 
welfare of the Indian child and the welfare of the child’s tribe. Thus, “Indian” should not 
be viewed as a racial classification for purposes of the ICWA, but rather as a political 
identification necessary for the continued self-governance of tribes. The ICWA was not 
written in a historical vacuum. Congress responded directly to the dire circumstances 
facing federally recognized Indian tribes who were losing their children, and enacted 
provisions to restore the tribes’ political power by granting them more control over child 
custody proceedings. To further this goal, Congress did not invent a racial definition of 
what it means to be Indian, but assumed that politically recognized Indian tribes were in 
the best position to define their own political memberships.57  
 
III. THE HISTORICAL RACIALIZATION OF INDIANS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
EFFECTS 
 
As shown by the Constitution itself in the Indian Commerce Clause,58 Indians have 
occupied a special status in the United States since its founding. Yet at the same time, 
courts and legal scholars have tried to fit Indian Law59 into other doctrines. Professor Philip 
Frickey describes this tendency as the “seduction of coherence,”60 whereby the legal 
community seeks to understand Indian Law by interpreting it as consistent with familiar 
concepts. Professor Bethany Berger makes an interesting case that the “seduction of 
coherence” is at its strongest, and perhaps most problematic, in the equal protection 
context.61 The following analysis focuses on the historical and modern reasons why Indian 
Law statutes do not fit neatly into the equal protection doctrine surrounding race-based 
legislation.  
While the equal protection doctrine, as it has developed, forces courts to determine 
if groups are distinctly racial,62 Indians fit neither into nor outside of a racial category. 
Indian tribes have incorporated racial elements into their self-definitions, in part in 
response to U.S. Government pressure.63 But, as will be examined, the racialization of 
                                                 
57 See supra note 30 for a discussion of § 1903(4).  
58 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
59 As explained by Felix Cohen in his seminal work, Indian Law governs issues related to the “rights, 
privileges, powers, or immunities of an Indian or an Indian tribe or an administrative agency set up to deal 
with Indian affairs, or where governing rules of law are affected by the fact that a place is under Indian 
ownership or devoted to Indian use.” FELIX S. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE 
SOLICITOR, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (1942). Indian Law issues can arise in cases with or 
without Indians or tribes as parties. Id. 
60 Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433, 
435–36 (2005).  
61 Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1166 
(2010).  
62 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”). 
63 See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 
1041, 1043 (2012).  
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Indians by the federal government was a historical tool to deprive them of their special 
status and to eliminate them from their land.64 At the same time, tribes remained political 
entities that were protected by the federal trust relationship.65 As explained by Felix Cohen, 
when “Indian” is used in a legal context, the “biological question of race is generally 
pertinent, but not conclusive.”66 Constitutional challenges asserting that the ICWA is race-
based ignore the uniquely mixed racial and political character of Indian tribes. 
Consequently, such challenges improperly analyze the ICWA under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 67  
 
A. Congressional Approaches to Tribal Membership, 1830s to 1970s 
 
Before colonization in pre-contact societies, tribes were largely formed out of 
ancestry and descent, but not exclusively.68 People without any ancestral tie to the tribe 
could sometimes become incorporated into the tribal structure.69 Reducing the original 
kinship structures to a concept of race based solely on “ancestry, blood, and genes”70 is 
therefore an oversimplification of what it means to be “Indian.” 
Initially, tribes were not officially recognized in any standard way; rather, they were 
dealt with on an ad hoc basis as the government recognized their existence.71 However, 
that changed in the 1830s due to removal policies designed to clear Indians from their 
traditional lands.72 These policies required the government to identify tribes, but the 
Supreme Court did not rule on how tribes could be identified until 1866.73 Removal policies 
were insufficient to eliminate the Indians from their lands, and 1871 harkened the 
                                                 
64 See id. at 1064 (explaining that in order to remove tribes from their homelands, the government first had 
to identify tribes with “possessory interests in their lands,” and otherwise categorize them).  
65 For a discussion of the Federal Trust relationship and its enforcement, see Reid Peyton Chambers, 
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV.1213 (1975). 
66 COHEN, supra note 59, at 2. 
67 For a discussion of how the Fourteenth Amendment was originally meant to apply or not apply to 
Indians, see Berger, supra note 61, at 1173–75. Berger argues that the jurisdiction provision in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is further evidence that the Equal Protection Clause was not meant to apply to 
Indians in the same way as it would to African Americans. See id. While this may support treating Indians 
differently, all Indians were made U.S. citizens by federal legislation in 1924. Id. at 1176. Once all Indians 
were U.S. citizens, the jurisdiction provision would no longer apply differently.  
68 Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1390 (2002). 
69 Id. 
70 See Desautels-Stein, supra note 22, at 4. 
71 Krakoff, supra note 63, at 1048.  
72 Id. at 1064. 
73 The Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to define tribes in both Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. 1 (1831), and in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 15 (1832). Instead, the Court focused on the 
consequences of being a tribe. It was not until In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866), that the Supreme 
Court ruled on the tribal status of a specific group of Indians, the Shawnee. The Court relied on the 
following factors: the existence of Shawnee political organizations, the federal government’s recognition of 
said political organizations, that the Shawnee were a distinct group, their treaty-power, and their separate 
jurisdiction from the state in which they resided. See id. at 1065. These factors are somewhat circular in 
that to be considered a tribe, they must already have treaty power and have separate jurisdiction from the 
state. At the same time, the factors highlight both the political and racial elements of tribes. The Shawnee 
had to be politically organized to qualify as a tribe, but they also had to be a distinct people. 
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beginning of what has been deemed the “Assimilation Period.”74 This period was 
characterized by the General Allotment Act of 1887 (the Dawes Act), which was intended 
to break up tribes by breaking up their land, and allotting it amongst the Indian tribe 
members.75 As described by Professor Sarah Krakoff, “[t]he racialized tribe was seen as 
the locus of Indian backwardness and inferiority. Destruction of the tribe was therefore 
prerequisite to liberating the individual Indian.”76 According to Krakoff, this period 
represents the height of the eliminationist policy towards Indians.77 
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act78 (IRA), which gave the 
Secretary of the Interior authority to approve or disapprove tribal constitutions.79 The IRA 
acknowledged that the Assimilation Period had left “a considerable number of Indians . . . 
entirely landless.”80 One of the goals of the IRA was “to stabilize the tribal organization of 
Indian tribes by vesting such tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority, and 
by prescribing conditions which must be met by such tribal organizations.”81 One hundred 
fifty tribes created constitutions under this Act, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
encouraged them to establish certain membership provisions.82 Among these were 
provisions related to blood quantum, which require a minimum percentage of blood tying 
an individual to a tribe.83 Although it provided for the tribes to define their membership, 
the IRA itself defined “Indian” based on descent, and alternatively based on blood 
quantum.84 As discussed, the element of descendancy85 was neither ahistorical, nor a 
significant departure from the practices of pre-contact tribes. More significant was the 
BIA’s emphasis on blood quantum for membership, which sets a clearly racial baseline for 
defining tribes. Thus, in attempting to reaffirm an element of tribal political sovereignty by 
protecting tribal lands, the Department of the Interior effectively maintained a racial 
element of tribal membership.  
By the 1970s, litigation had brought greater attention to the struggles of Indian 
tribes.86 One such struggle was that of non-recognition, or lack of acknowledgement by the 
                                                 
74 Id. at 1066. 
75 Krakoff, supra note 63, at 1067 (discussing the Indian General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887)). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1069; see also id. at 1050 (explaining that the racialization of Indians was very different from the 
racialization of African Americans, because the goal for the former was to remove them from their lands by 
decreasing their numbers, whereas the goal for the latter was proliferation to increase the slave workforce). 
78 Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934).  
79 Krakoff, supra note 63, at 1075; see also Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship 
Requirements for Indian Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 446 (2002). 
80 S. REP. NO. 73-1080, at 1 (1934). 
81 Id. 
82 Goldberg, supra note 79, at 446. 
83 Id. 
84 Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1934) (“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include 
all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing 
within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-
half or more Indian blood.”). 
85 For consistency purposes, this Paper refers to this term as “descendancy,” except when quoting a primary 
source with an alternate spelling. The scholarship around the issue uses different variations of the term (i.e. 
“decendency”). 
86 Krakoff, supra note 63, at 1078. 
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federal government.87 Despite the IRA, many tribes were still falling through the cracks, 
and there was no clear administrative process for recognition.88 In response, Congress 
established the American Indian Policy Review Commission, which in turn created the 
Task Force on Terminated and Nonfederally Recognized Indians.89 After a report on the 
problems with nonrecognition, the BIA adopted clear administrative procedures for official 
federal recognition of tribal status.90 These procedures were most recently amended in July 
of 2015.91 Despite some critics requesting the removal of descent from the criteria for tribal 
recognition, the BIA maintained the criteria,92 and responded as follows: 
 
Some commenters stated that criterion (e) should be deleted because it is race-based, 
while tribal membership is a political classification.  
 
Response: The Department recognizes descent from a political entity (tribe or tribes) 
as a basis from which evaluations of identification, community, and political 
influence/authority under criteria (a), (b), and (c) may reveal continuation of that 
political entity. Evidence sufficient to satisfy (e) is utilized as an approximation of 
tribal membership before 1900.93 
 
The BIA’s response to this criticism is crucial, because it explicitly justifies what 
could be construed as a race-based criterion as a basis for “continuation of that political 
entity.”94 To the BIA, descent is not about race; it is about providing evidence of a political 
connection to a political entity.95 
Despite the BIA’s emphasis on the political nature of tribes, many tribes currently 
define membership using blood quantum and descendancy, among other requirements.96 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2015).  
92 The “Descent” criterion for recognition reads, in part, as follows: “The petitioner’s membership consists 
of individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe . . . The petitioner satisfies this criterion by 
demonstrating that the petitioner’s members descend from a tribal roll directed by Congress or prepared by 
the Secretary on a descendancy basis for purposes of distributing claims money, providing allotments, 
providing a tribal census, or other purposes, unless significant countervailing evidence establishes that the 
tribal roll is substantively inaccurate . . . .” Id. at § 83(e). The regulation goes on to direct tribes with no 
tribal rolls on how to proceed in proving the element of descent. Id. 
93 Id.   
94 Id. 
95 The other BIA criteria for recognition reaffirm this political understanding of “Indian.” Other criteria 
include (a) identifying “as an American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1900”; (b) 
comprising a “distinct community” that has existed since 1900; (c) maintaining “political influence or 
authority over its members” since 1900; (d) providing the “governing document” or “written statement” 
that explains the membership criteria; (e) having members descending from a historical tribe, as discussed 
supra note 91; (f) having members “who are not members of a federally recognized Indian tribe”; and (g) 
not having been “expressly terminated or forbidden.” 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a)–(g).  
96 Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2012); 
see also Tribal Enrollment Process, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/tribes/enrollment (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2018) (“Two common requirements for membership are lineal decendency from someone 
named on the tribe's base roll or relationship to a tribal member who descended from someone named on 
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Based on the above historical analysis, these requirements are likely consistent with both 
tribal traditions regarding belonging, as well as with the direction in which the federal 
government pushed tribes over the years. As argued by Krakoff, regardless of the racial 
element of tribal membership, tribes are political in two key ways: pre-contact tribes 
retained some political sovereignty, and the existence of tribes was used by the government 
to politically subordinate Indians.97 Thus, at this point, attempting to untangle the racial 
from political in tribal relations would both undermine tribal sovereignty, and ignore the 
historical context of the subordination of Indians. Dealing with this complex history, the 
Supreme Court found a way to maintain equal protection of Indians without undermining 
tribal sovereignty in Morton v. Mancari. 
 
B. Morton v. Mancari (1974) 
 
In a unanimous decision in Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court upheld a provision 
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 creating a hiring preference for Indian employees 
in the BIA.98 The Court found that the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972 did 
not implicitly repeal the provision, and that the preference did not constitute “invidious 
racial discrimination” under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.99 Writing 
for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that this preference could not be racial 
discrimination because “it is not even a ‘racial’ preference.”100 In this case, the Court 
created a new version of rational basis review specific to Indians, where legislation would 
be upheld if it was rationally related to “Congress’ unique obligation toward the 
Indians.”101  
Importantly, protection for Indians under the Equal Employment Opportunities Act 
of 1972 did not solely require tribal membership, but also required that a person be at least 
one-quarter Indian, which is a blood quantum provision.102 This differs from the ICWA 
which defers entirely to the tribe’s own determination for membership, without imposing 
a blood quantum.103 In Mancari, the Court stated that the preference was “granted to 
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal 
entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in unique fashion.”104 Therefore, 
the case for racial discrimination is even weaker regarding the ICWA, since the legislation 
                                                 
the base roll . . . . Other conditions such as tribal blood quantum, tribal residency, or continued contact with 
the tribe are common.”).  
97 Krakoff, supra note 63, at 1048. 
98 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 535. 
99 Id. at 551–54. 
100 Id. at 553; see also id. at 553 n.24 (explaining that the preference was directed not towards a race, but 
rather to “members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes”). 
101 See id. at 555 (“As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ 
unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where the 
preference is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that 
Congress’ classification violates due process.”). 
102 See id. at 553 n.24 (“To be eligible for preference . . . an individual must be one-fourth or more degree 
Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized tribe.”). 
103 See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (“[A]ny unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member 
of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member 
of an Indian tribe.”). 
104 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554. 
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itself is silent on bloodlines. The ICWA does require that an Indian child who is eligible 
for membership, but not yet a tribe member, be the “biological child of a member of an 
Indian tribe.”105 However, this provision is related to descendancy rather than bloodlines. 
The parent is required to be a tribe member, not to meet a specified blood quantum. If 
Mancari is correct in the context of a statute with an explicit blood quantum provision, 
then the ICWA certainly is an expression of “Congress’ unique obligation toward the 
Indians”106 as tribes, rather than race-based legislation. 
Although there have not been more recent equal protection cases regarding Indian 
Law, the Court continues to uphold tribal sovereignty in other, arguably less controversial, 
contexts.107 The idea of sovereignty is closely tied to the consideration of tribes as political 
entities, rather than as racial groups. Despite small affirmations of tribal sovereignty, the 
Court has also opened the door to equal protection challenges in the ICWA context, 
presenting an inconsistent understanding of what it means to be “Indian.”  
 
IV. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE ICWA 
 
Although there is a plethora of state court decisions regarding the ICWA, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has interpreted its provisions on only two occasions: in Holyfield108 and in 
Baby Veronica.109 These decisions do not explicitly state whether “Indian” is racial or 
political, but the Court’s restatements of the legislative intent and purpose of the ICWA do 
provide helpful windows into how it understands the term. However, the two cases differ 
substantially in their interpretation of the ICWA. The two interpretations mirror the racial-
political dichotomy discussed in Part I, and highlight the difficulty of treating Indian 
legislation under traditional equal protection doctrine.  
 
A. Holyfield (1989) 
 
The key holding of Holyfield110 is the Court’s interpretation of the word “domiciled” 
in § 1911 of the ICWA regarding tribal jurisdiction,111 but the opinion has broader 
implications for the construction of “Indian.” In Holyfield, an Indian mother arranged for 
the adoption of her twins by the Holyfields, a non-Indian couple.112 The children never 
lived on the reservation or even visited the reservation, but both of their parents were 
domiciled on the reservation.113 Even though the domicile of minor children is typically 
that of their parents, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the children were not 
                                                 
105 25 U.S.C § 1903(4).  
106 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. 
107 See Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (affirming the 
judgment of the lower court in an unsigned per curiam decision, with the effect that tribal courts have 
jurisdiction over civil tort claims against non-tribal members); see also United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 
1954, 1966 (2016) (holding that tribal convictions can be used for purposes of sentence enhancement in a 
federal criminal case under the Sixth Amendment).  
108 490 U.S. 30. 
109 133 S. Ct. 2552. 
110 490 U.S. at 53–54.  
111 See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1978).  
112 490 U.S. at 39. 
113 Id. at 37. 
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domiciled on the reservation because the mother had intentionally given birth 200 miles 
from the reservation, and had legally abandoned the twins under state law.114 The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Mississippi Band of Indian Choctaw twin babies 
were “domiciled” on the reservation under § 1911 of the ICWA.115 
In a majority opinion delivered by Justice Brennan, the Court determined that the 
legislature must have intended a uniform, federal definition of “domiciled” for purposes of 
the ICWA.116 Usually a child’s domicile is wherever the parents are domiciled, and there 
is no reason to believe Congress intended to deviate from that understanding.117 The Court 
connected this definition to what they believed to be a primary purpose of the ICWA: 
protecting not just the best interest of Indian children and families, but also the interests of 
the tribe.118  
In support of its holding, the Court cited to a discussion of § 1915 found in the House 
of Representative Report, which stated that the ICWA “seeks to protect the rights of the 
Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its 
children in its society.”119 The Court also cited to the testimony of Mr. Calvin Isaac, Tribal 
Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, who testified to the “chances of Indian 
survival” and tribal self-governance.120 Finally, the majority quoted the Supreme Court of 
Utah to summarize the tribal interest, which that court found to be “on a parity with the 
interest of the parents.”121 According to the Supreme Court of Utah:   
 
This relationship between Indian tribes and Indian children domiciled on the 
reservation finds no parallel in other ethnic cultures found in the United States. It is 
a relationship that many non-Indians find difficult to understand . . . State 
abandonment law cannot be used to frustrate the federal legislative judgment 
expressed in the ICWA that the interests of the tribe in custodial decisions . . . are as 
entitled to respect as the interests of the parents.122 
 
Thus, as expressed by the Supreme Court of Utah and accepted by the majority in Holyfield, 
the unique relationship of a tribe to its children necessitates the tribal interest in custody 
proceedings. 
Justice Stevens’ dissent characterized tribal rights very differently. He stated that the 
ICWA’s primary goal is preventing “unjustified removal of Indian children from their 
families,” and found that the Act gives tribes rights “not to restrict the rights of parents of 
Indian children, but to complement and help effect them.”123 He did acknowledge an 
                                                 
114 Id. at 39–40. 
115 Id. at 41. 
116 Id. at 43. 
117 Id. at 44–45. 
118 See id. at 49 (“Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be defeated by the actions of 
individual members of the tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian 
children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian 
children adopted by non-Indians.”). 
119 Id. at 37 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23).  
120 Id. at 34. 
121 Id. at 52–53 (citing In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969–70 (1986)). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 55, 57. 
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element of tribal sovereignty, but only “over the domestic relations of tribe members,” such 
that once a child was abandoned, they would assume the domicile of their caregiver.124  
The argument regarding how to understand “domicile” reveals a larger debate about 
whether the ICWA is intended to protect tribes, Indian families, or both. While on the 
surface the difference in emphasis may seem subtle, the doctrinal implications for the 
ICWA are significant. In Holyfield, the majority of the Supreme Court emphasized the 
ICWA’s purpose as related to tribes just as much as it did the purpose related to Indian 
children and families.125 Although not explicit, the connection to the tribe supports a 
political understanding of “Indian.” This emphasis is consistent with a broader view of the 
ICWA as part of a larger body of Indian regulations designed to protect the unique political 
status of tribes.  
Alternatively, Justice Stevens’ approach to the ICWA focused narrowly on the 
interest of the parents. For him, granting jurisdiction to the tribe was merely a means of 
ensuring the protection of Indian parental rights. If the parent abandoned the child, then 
there is no longer a need to grant the tribe jurisdiction. By minimizing the role of the tribe, 
his approach effectively places the ICWA outside the context of other Indian regulations 
designed to ensure self-government. In that sense, “Indian” becomes more of a racial 
classification, and the Act a remedial legislation targeted towards protecting parents with 
Indian heritage.  
This subtle difference in focus has a huge doctrinal impact. Within the body of Indian 
regulations, the ICWA might not look so different in that it recognizes the special federal 
obligation to protect tribal interests. However, placed in the context of other child custody 
laws, the ICWA’s regulations stand out.126 By the time the Supreme Court took a second 
look at the ICWA in 2013, there was a notable shift in the Court towards the latter, more 
racial lens. 
 
B. Baby Veronica Case 
 
In Baby Veronica,127 it seems that Justice Stevens’ narrower interpretation of the 
tribal role in the ICWA won the day. In only the second ICWA case to make it to the 
nation’s highest court,128 the Court primarily interpreted the phrase “continued custody” in 
§ 1912(f), the phrase “breakup of families” in § 1912(d), and the word “preference” in § 
1915(a).129 Dusten Brown, an Indian father, sought to halt the adoption proceedings of his 
                                                 
124 Id. at 58. 
125 See generally id. 
126 See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Response to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and State Defendant’s 
Motion to Abstain and Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6) at 2, Carter et al. v. Washburn et 
al., No. 2:15-cv-01259-NVW (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss] (“Once ICWA is implicated in a child custody proceeding, state rules and procedures 
no longer apply in ordinary fashion.”). For example, in Arizona, when the parents’ rights are terminated, 
ordinarily the law “establishes a preference for adoption by ‘a person who has a significant relationship 
with the child,’ including a ‘foster parent.’” Id. at 11. However, if the custody proceeding is subject to the 
ICWA, then there is a “statutory pecking order” that prefers Indian families. Id. 
127 Baby Veronica, 133 S. Ct. 2552. 
128 See Kathleena Kruck, The Indian Child Welfare Act’s Waning Power after Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 445, 459 (2015). 
129 Baby Veronica, 133 S. Ct. at 2557. 
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daughter, Veronica, by the non-Indian Capobiancos.130 Although the state court ruled in 
his favor, the Supreme Court reversed.131 
The Court held that § 1912(f), which protects Indian parents’ rights to ‘continued 
custody’ of their children, did not apply when Mr. Brown never had custody of Veronica.132 
Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion, which justified this interpretation using the 
plain language of the statute and the definition of “continued.”133 Justice Alito added that 
“[w]hen . . . the adoption of an Indian child is voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-
Indian parent with sole custodial rights, the ICWA’s primary goal of preventing the 
unwarranted removal of Indian children and the dissolution of Indian families is not 
implicated.”134 This analysis mirrors Justice Stevens’ understanding of the primary goal of 
the ICWA in Holyfield, leaving out the protection of tribal interests. By removing tribal 
interests from the legislative interpretation, Justice Alito implicitly suggests a racial 
understanding of “Indian.”135 
The majority’s racial understanding of the Act is further revealed by its interpretation 
of the “breakup of the Indian family” language and the placement preference provision. 
The majority found that the “active efforts” provision, which requires social workers to 
offer services before terminating Indian parental rights, does not apply when “the parent 
abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had custody of the child,” because there 
would be no “breakup of the Indian family.”136 Since Mr. Brown never had custody of 
Veronica, and he was the Indian parent, the majority did not think she had an Indian family 
to begin with.137 Although the Cherokee Nation was never properly notified of Veronica’s 
case, the Court found that since no Cherokee families tried to adopt Veronica, and Mr. 
Brown was not seeking to adopt her himself, there could be no placement “preference” 
under § 1915(a).138  
The majority opinion weakened the political understanding of the term “Indian” in 
the ICWA by reading out any tribal interest in Indian children. When construing the 
“continued custody” provision as limited to Indian parents that have had custody of their 
child, the majority excluded protection of tribal sovereignty as a goal of the ICWA. By 
                                                 
130 Id. at 2556 (characterizing the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision as holding that “certain 
provisions of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 required her to be taken, at the age of 27 
months, from the only parents she had ever known and handed over to her biological father, who had 
attempted to relinquish his parental rights and who had no prior contact with the child”).  
131 Id. at 2557. 
132 Id. at 2560–62. 
133 See id. (citing to two different dictionary definitions of “continued”). 
134 Id. at 2561 (emphasis added). 
135 See also id. at 2559 (“It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father 
would have had no right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law.”). 
136 Id. at 2557. 
137 Id. at 2563 (“It would, however, be unusual to apply § 1912(d) in the context of an Indian parent who 
abandoned a child prior to birth and who never had custody of the child.”). 
138 The majority did not mention a clerical error, which caused the Cherokee Nation to not be properly 
notified under the ICWA. See Allyson Bird, James Island Family Turns Over 2-Year-Old Girl following 
Court Order, POST & COURIER, (Dec. 31, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20111231/PC16/312319969. Veronica’s mother attempted to check 
with the Cherokee Nation to see if Mr. Brown was a member. Id. However, he spelled Mr. Brown’s name 
incorrectly and provided the wrong date of birth. Id. The Cherokee Nation was thus unable to confirm his 
tribal membership. Id. 
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construing the term “Indian family” narrowly, to include only family with which the child 
had lived, the majority precluded any future connection to the tribe. The majority also 
claimed that no Cherokee family sought to adopt Veronica, but ignored the lack of tribal 
notice in the case, effectively undermining the Cherokee Nation’s interest in the child.139  
Additionally, some dicta of the majority opinion can be seen as inviting a broader 
constitutional challenge to the Act under a theory of racial discrimination.140 Justice Alito 
states in his opinion that interpreting the provisions at issue in the manner suggested by the 
dissent would “raise equal protection concerns.”141 Yet, it is ambiguous whether he or the 
other Justices believe that the provisions raise equal protection concerns as interpreted by 
the majority, since they do not reach the question in Baby Veronica’s case.  
Other parts of the opinion suggest that the majority felt negatively about the 
application of the ICWA in general. For instance, Justice Alito describes a hypothetical 
case under the dissents’ interpretation of the provisions where the father would “abandon 
his child in utero and refuse any support for the birth mother,” encourage her to put the 
child up for adoption, and then “play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override 
the mother’s decision and the child’s best interests.”142 He also expresses that Indian 
children under the ICWA may be less likely to be adopted, stating concerns with 
“dissuad[ing] some . . . from seeking to adopt Indian children,” which would 
“unnecessarily place vulnerable Indian children at a unique disadvantage in finding a 
permanent and loving home . . . .”143  
Justice Alito’s strong statements imply that the ICWA leaves Indian children 
vulnerable to the whims of the Indian parent, and acts to delay their search for a stable 
home. This alternative vision of the ICWA as racially discriminatory legislation relies on 
vague hypotheticals rather than facts. It is unclear, for example, if non-Indian families are 
actually discouraged from adopting Indian children by the ICWA. Even if they were, one 
would still have to prove the ICWA negatively impacts the children’s ability to be placed 
in homes, implying that they are without an Indian placement. The majority’s reasoning 
confuses (a) the ability to place Indian children in non-Indian homes with (b) the ability to 
place Indian children in adoptive homes more generally. The majority acts, without 
evidence, as if a barrier to (a) is the same as a barrier to (b). While tribal sovereignty and 
the importance of the tribe to the Indian child were central considerations in the Holyfield 
decision, the Baby Veronica opinion reads more like an Assimilationist-Era text, re-
imposing a race-based understanding on what it means to be “Indian.” 
 
                                                 
139 For a thorough discussion of the ramifications of the Baby Veronica decision, see Kruck, supra note 
128. 
140 See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 126, at 1 (“This case is a 
successor to Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.”). See also First Amended Civil Rights Class Action 
Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 26, Carter, No. 2:15-cv-01259 (D. Ariz. Apr. 5, 
2016) [hereinafter Amended Complaint] (“Although the court did not reach constitutional issues, a core 
premise of the Baby Veronica decision . . . was that ICWA cannot force a child to create a racially-
conforming relationship and that a child would not be made to sever existing relationships in order to create 
new racially-conforming ones.”). 
141 Baby Veronica, 133 S. Ct. at 2565. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 2563–64. 
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V. A CURRENT CHALLENGE: CARTER, ET AL. V. WASHBURN, ET AL. 
 
After Baby Veronica, it was only a matter of time before a more comprehensive 
challenge to the ICWA surfaced, and, sure enough, the Goldwater Institute quickly 
spearheaded the charge. Founded in 1988 by Senator Barry Goldwater, the Goldwater 
Institute is a conservative think tank based in Arizona.144 In July 2015, the Goldwater 
Institute filed a class action lawsuit in the District Court of Arizona,145 claiming that key 
provisions of the ICWA and the amended BIA guidelines are unconstitutional as written 
and as applied.146 The complaint includes seven counts, arguing that certain key ICWA 
provisions are unconstitutional and that new BIA guidelines are also unconstitutional.147 
The first count and the focus of this discussion is an equal protection claim under the Fifth 
Amendment. Based on this claim, the plaintiffs seek an injunction148 against the application 
of the ICWA’s jurisdiction-transfer provision, “active-efforts” provision, burdens of proof 
for foster care placement and termination of parental rights, and placement preferences.149  
The named plaintiffs in this case are baby girls A.D. and L.G., baby boys C.C. and 
C.R., and three foster/adoptive couples, all of whom allegedly suffered injury due to the 
                                                 
144 See About, GOLDWATER INST., http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/about/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
Ironically, then-Senator Goldwater voted for the ICWA in 1977. See Suzette Brewer, War of Words: ICWA 
Faces Multiple Assaults from Adoption Industry, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA (July 8, 2015), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/07/08/war-words-icwa-faces-multiple-assaults-adoption-
industry-160993. Regarding the current litigation against the ICWA, Senator James Abourezk stated, “I 
knew Barry Goldwater—he was my friend and often came to me for advice on most tribal matters . . . I 
wish he were alive to see this travesty because he would never approve of it . . . .” Id. 
145 Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Carter, No. 2:15-cv-01259 
(D. Ariz. July 6, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
146 See A.D. v. Washburn, GOLDWATER INST. (July 7, 2015), 
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/constitutional-rights/equal-protection/case/equal-protection-
for-indian-children/. 
147 See generally Amended Complaint, supra note 140. Other constitutional claims beyond the scope of this 
Paper include that certain ICWA provisions violate procedural and substantive due process, that the ICWA 
as a whole exceeds the federal government’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment, and that it violates the freedom of association under the First Amendment by forcing children 
to “associate with and become members of federally-recognized tribes.” Id. at 32. Additionally, plaintiffs 
claim that the BIA’s actions in issuing new guidelines were unlawful and “in excess of statutory authority.” 
Id. at 33. Finally, the complaint alleges that DCS receives federal financial assistance, and Mr. McKay has 
subjected these plaintiffs to de jure discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Id. 
148 See id. at 28.  
149 The claims for relief under the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment refer to multiple 
ICWA provisions, as well as new BIA guidelines. The first is the jurisdiction-transfer provision, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1911(b). See Amended Complaint, supra note 140, at 26 (“The jurisdiction-transfer provision . . . is based 
solely on the race of the child and the adults involved.”). The second is the “active efforts” provision, 
which allegedly “creates a separate set of procedures for children with Indian ancestry and all other 
children based solely on the child’s race.” Id. Next are the burdens of proof for foster care placement and 
termination of parental rights. Id. at 26–27 (“Government cannot treat the best interests of children with 
Indian ancestry differently and less seriously than those of other children.”). Finally, the Amended 
Complaint goes straight to the heart of the ICWA: the placement preferences. Id. at 27 (stating these 
preferences “single out and treat differently children with Indian ancestry” as well as “non-Indian adults 
involved in the care and upbringing” of Indian children). 
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ICWA.150 The complaint names defendants Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs of the 
BIA Kevin Washburn and Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell.151 The complaint also 
names Director of the Arizona Department of Child Safety, Gregory McKay, who has a 
statutory duty to “protect children” and is tasked with ensuring departmental compliance 
with the ICWA.152 The Gila River Indian Community filed a motion to intervene as a 
defendant in October of 2015,153 and the Navajo Nation Department of Justice filed a 
similar motion the following month.154 The tribes and government defendants filed motions 
to dismiss the amended complaint, which were granted due to lack of standing.155 Plaintiffs 
have appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where they hope to 
prove standing and reach the merits of the case.156 
The complaint reveals much about how the plaintiffs and Goldwater Institute seek to 
portray the ICWA. The named plaintiffs filed this class action “on behalf of themselves 
and all off-reservation Arizona-resident children with Indian ancestry and all off-
reservation Arizona-resident foster, preadoptive, and prospective adoptive parents in child 
custody proceedings involving children with Indian ancestry.”157 By using the term 
“ancestry” repeatedly in their class-certification, rather than Indian child as defined by the 
ICWA, the complaint emphasizes “Indian” as a race-based determination. The use of the 
word “ancestry” in particular makes the connection to Indian culture sound historical, 
rather than a living, breathing connection to the tribe.  
                                                 
150 The child-plaintiffs seem to have been chosen not because they were sent to live with Indian families 
against their best interest, but rather because compliance with ICWA allegedly caused them to spend 
additional time in foster care. For example, Baby Boy C.C. “languished in foster care for approximately 
four years” before his foster parents could legally adopt him. Id. at 8. All the children-plaintiffs, except 
Baby Girl L.G., have more than 50% non-Indian blood, and are enrolled or eligible to enroll in either the 
Gila River Indian Community or the Navajo Nation. Id. at 3–4. Baby Girl L.G. is not eligible for tribal 
membership, but her half-brother Baby boy C.R. is eligible. Id. at 4. Thus, in their consolidated child 
custody proceeding, Baby Girl L.G. was subject to the same ICWA related delays as her brother. Id. at 10.  
151 See id.  
152 See id.  
153 The Gila River Indian Community asserted two interests under Rule 24(a)(2). See Motion of the Gila 
River Indian Community to Intervene as Defendant, Carter, No. 2:15-cv-01259 (D. Ariz. Oct. 16, 2015). 
First, Baby Girl A.D. was an enrolled member of the Community. See id. at 3.  Second, the plaintiffs’ 
claims of the unconstitutionality of certain provisions would “eliminate” the Community’s role in her 
custody proceedings. Id. at 4. 
154 The Navajo Nation asserted two similar interests in the subject of this action under Rule 24(a)(2). See 
Navajo Nation Motion to Intervene, Carter, No. 2:15-cv-01259 (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 2015). The first was that 
Baby Boy C is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, and the plaintiffs were “seeking to prohibit the 
application of ICWA to Navajo children in state custody . . . .” Id. at 4. The second interest was the Navajo 
Nation’s “ability to determine its own citizenship and protect its children who are enrolled citizens.” Id. 
The Navajo Nation interpreted the plaintiffs’ claim as attacking typical tribal membership policies that rely 
on “blood quantum or lineage.” Id. at 5. 
155 See Order at 1, 3, Carter, No. 2:15-cv-01259-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017) (“From the outset 
Plaintiffs have grounded sweeping challenges to ICWA and the 2015 Guidelines on vague or narrow 
allegations of their own experience with ICWA.”); see also id. at 19 (“They do not have standing to have 
this Court pre-adjudicate for state court judges how to rule on facts that may arise and that may be 
governed by statutes or guidelines that this Court may think invalid.”). 
156 See Appellants’ Opening Brief at 1, Carter et al. v. Washburn et al., No. 17-15839 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 
2017) (“Plaintiffs have been—and the proposed class are going to be—deprived of their right to equal 
treatment under the law.”).  
157 Id. at 2–3. 
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Furthermore, the complaint juxtaposes the ICWA with other child custody laws, 
rather than placing it in the context of Indian Law more broadly. Plaintiffs’ counsel argues 
that the plaintiffs are similarly situated by claiming: “But for ICWA, a strong likelihood 
exists that these families . . . would be allowed to become permanent under race-neutral 
Arizona laws permitting individualized race-neutral evaluation by state court of what is in 
the children’s best interests.”158 If other child custody laws in Arizona are “race-neutral,”159 
then the ICWA is, by implication, race-based. This characterization of the ICWA, in 
combination with defining the class of children by their “Indian ancestry,” seeks to erase 
the modern tribe from the picture entirely.   
From the first sentence of the complaint, it is evident that this case is a direct claim 
of racial discrimination. The first three citations160 are to Brown v. Board of Education,161 
Dred Scott v. Sandford,162 and Plessy v. Ferguson.163 Plaintiffs claim that “[c]hildren with 
Indian ancestry . . . are still living in the era of Plessy . . . .”164 Next, the plaintiffs point to 
the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) and the Interethnic Placement Act (IEPA), both of 
which prohibit discrimination based on race, color, or ethnicity in adoption placements.165 
These references reaffirm the positioning of the ICWA squarely in the context of family 
law, rather than Indian Law. Thus, the plaintiffs set the stage for their main argument: the 
ICWA discriminates based on race, because “Indian” is a racial classification.166 While the 
characterization of the ICWA may seem minor in comparison to their more substantive 
claims, the plaintiffs’ positioning of the case is fundamental to achieving strict scrutiny, 
and therefore maximizing their chance of success on the equal protection claim.167  
The plaintiffs will likely try to build on Justice Alito’s understanding of the ICWA 
in the Baby Veronica case, but they have a serious precedent problem. As discussed in Part 
IV, the Supreme Court has previously found that “Indian” does not refer to race but to a 
                                                 
158 Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
159 Id. 
160 See Amended Complaint, supra note 140, at 2. 
161 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
162 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
163 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
164 Plessy held that maintaining separate but equal train-cars for African Americans was constitutional. Id. 
at 550–51. For more on the comparison to Plessy, see Clint Bolick, Native American Children: Separate 
but Equal?, HOOVER INST. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.hoover.org/research/native-american-children-
separate-equal (“More than a century ago, Adolph Plessy was consigned by law to a separate “colored” 
streetcar because he was one-eighth black. Today, children with only a small percentage of Indian blood 
and few if any ties to a reservation are involuntarily made subject to tribal jurisdiction and deprived of their 
full rights of American citizenship.”).  
165 For a comparison between the MEPA and the ICWA, see Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and 
Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 
(2008).  
166 See Amended Complaint, supra note 140, at 2. 
167 Race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (stating that “all 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect” and subject 
to the “most rigid scrutiny”). It is also possible that the “Indian” as a political category could be a suspect 
class subject to strict scrutiny, considering historical discrimination and lack of political access. See United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 US 144, 153 n.4 (1938). However, neither side would likely make this 
argument. For the plaintiffs, this would force them to discuss the reasons for the ICWA in the first place, 
only heightening the need for tribal protections. For the defendants, regarding Indians as a political 
category defined as a “suspect class” would ironically make it easier to strike down the ICWA.  
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political group.168 Therefore, if the case proceeds to the merits, the plaintiffs must ask the 
court to make a leap from the text of the ICWA to tribal standards for membership, which 
often look to blood quantum and lineage.169 If a court reaches the merits and adopts this 
logic, then the plaintiffs can make a historical analogy to the “One Drop Rule.”170 The 
“One Drop Rule” developed as a way to define African-Americans as black, and therefore 
subordinate them, even if they only had one black ancestor.171 If the defendants 
successfully argue that the ICWA is about political affiliation rather than race, they avoid 
strict scrutiny. Thus, the outcome of this case likely hinges on the interpretation of “Indian” 




Passed during a period when the official federal policy had turned towards tribal self-
determination,172 the ICWA protects tribal sovereignty by granting tribes power over their 
child custody proceedings. In the context of legislation such as the ICWA that treats the 
tribes as political entities, there is no defensible reason to apply strict scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause. For purposes of the ICWA, “Indian” is much closer to a political 
classification than a racial classification because it explicitly defers to the Indian tribes’ 
definition of “Indian,” and does not seek to impose race-based restrictions. Any fair reading 
of the statute must note the important tribal interest at stake in maintaining sovereignty, 
based on legislative history and the historical context of Indian identity in the United States. 
This reading does not mean that tribal interests are more important than the best interests 
of Indian children, but rather recognizes that they are inextricably linked.  
Treating the statute as race-based legislation would be an unfair characterization of 
the ICWA and would lead to an improper application of strict scrutiny. In Morton v. 
Mancari, the Supreme Court understood the unique relationship between the federal 
government and the tribes. The modern battle over the ICWA is threatening this political 
relationship by seeking to redefine “Indian” in a racial manner. If the ICWA is to be 
                                                 
168 See Mancari, 417 U.S. 535. See also Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities at 2, Carter, No. 2:15-cv-01259 (D. Ariz. Oct. 16, 2015) (“The claim that provisions 
of ICWA are racially discriminatory is foreclosed by governing Supreme Court precedent . . . establish[ing] 
that classifications based on tribal membership . . . are political, not racial classifications.”); United States 
v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977) (reaffirming the holding of Mancari, and finding that “federal 
legislation with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not based on impermissible 
racial classifications”). 
169 See Paul Adams, Blood Quantum Influences Native American Identity, BBC (July 10, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-14089253 (describing the range of practices of tribes, from 
requiring a 50% tribal blood for membership, to requiring 6.25% tribal blood, to not having a blood 
quantum requirement at all). 
170 For an analogy to the “One Drop Rule”, see Israel & Dewan, supra note 19 (showing Goldwater 
Institute Vice President of Litigation, Timothy Sandefur, made the following statement: “Imagine if you 
said, if you have a single drop of Chinese blood . . . It would be obviously a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment”). 
171 For a thorough discussion of the “One Drop Rule,” see Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One 
Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1163 
(1997). 
172 See Gallagher, supra note 41, at 87. 
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challenged, it should be challenged on its own merits and treated as legislation based on 
the unique political classification of “Indian.”  
Some may be concerned by the broader implications of treating “Indian” as a political 
classification, such as Congress passing legislation that harms Indian sovereignty, or even 
legislation based on racial biases that could pass rational basis review. However, I perceive 
two safeguards to this problem. The first is that such legislation is unlikely to be rationally 
tied to the unique relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, under the 
Mancari standard. The Supreme Court could have chosen to apply regular rational basis 
review in Mancari, but instead created a caveat. This caveat is consistent with both the 
intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a realistic understanding of the 
historical subordination of Indians in the United States. If legislation is not related to this 
unique relationship, it could be struck down. By asking if the legislation is related to the 
unique relationship, the Court is essentially asking if the legislation treats Indians as a 
political rather than racial group. 
The second safeguard is that any hypothetical racist legislation targeting Indians is 
likely to impose some race-based definition of Indian. This could be considered the 
legislative slip-up safeguard. It seems unlikely that discriminatory legislation would allow 
the discriminated party to self-define. If it did, Indian tribes could essentially opt out by 
adjusting their own charters or membership structures. Legislative history may also 
indicate race-based intent. Thus, even if the legislation is arguably related to the unique 
relationship between tribes and the government under Mancari, plaintiffs could argue that 
“Indian” was intended as a race-based classification for purposes of the statute, such that 
it merits strict scrutiny. 
The Census gives respondents the opportunity to mark “Indian” as their race and to 
separately identify as a member of a tribe.173 Being Indian can certainly mean both. While 
there are no easy answers as to whether Indian is political or racial, the question becomes 
to what extent a court should make that decision for tribes. As the ICWA faces broader 
constitutional challenges, it is an important time to fight to maintain the Mancari standard, 
despite its potential drawbacks. To do so, ICWA proponents should demonstrate that 
“Indian” is a political classification for purposes of the ICWA, and that efforts to reframe 
the ICWA as race-based legislation are inconsistent with both legislative intent and the 
unique relationship between the federal government and tribes. 
                                                 
173 See Goldberg, supra note 68, at 1394. 
